



Somalia Accountability Programme



# Pathways to accountability for women and marginalised groups in the Somali context: The role of non-state actors

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## The Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme (IAAAP)

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# Acronyms

<b>CDD/R</b>	Community-driven development/reconstruction
<b>CMC</b>	Community management committee
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organisation
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department for International Development
<b>FGS</b>	Federal Government of Somalia
<b>FMS</b>	Federal Member States
<b>FCAS</b>	Fragile and conflict-affected states
<b>GESI</b>	Gender equity and social inclusion
<b>IAAAP</b>	Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>ISM</b>	Informal settlement manager
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and evaluation
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OPOV</b>	One person one vote
<b>PEA</b>	Political economy analysis
<b>PwD</b>	People with disabilities

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# Executive summary

The Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme (IAAAP) is an action-research initiative, funded by UK Aid, to test what may or may not work to strengthen accountability in Somalia. IAAAP is managed on behalf of DFID by BMB Mott Macdonald, in partnership with Social Development Direct (SDDirect). IAAAP partners have conducted action research and tested models for greater accountability in Somalia. The programme was conceived as an innovation lab and as an experiment in adaptive programming. After three years of operation, IAAAP has produced ground-breaking evidence and analysis, and has generated a unique body of data, on the underlying political economy of accountability issues in Somalia. Some of this work offers insights into the nexus between accountability, gender inequality and social inclusion in the Somali context. This paper explores the contribution of non-state actors to this nexus.<sup>1</sup>

## Key learning questions

### What are the most promising pathways to accountability for women and marginalised groups in the Somali context?

- How do marginalised groups feel they can effectively raise their voices to influence events and promote/ effectchange in Somalia?
- What kind of approaches can increase their demand for accountability?
- What mechanisms are being used to identify and work with potential champions for gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) in various spheres of accountability?
- Who are the current champions and what is the impact of identifying and working with such champions?

## Key messages emerging from IAAAP

- > **Non-state actors play a critical but complex role in supporting pro-accountability agendas:** Competing interests and interactions shape the actions of influential non-state actors and stakeholders, who may simultaneously act as champions and spoilers. Further evidence gathering, and flexible donor support, is needed to inform the development of safe and innovative engagement in Somalia's high-risk context.
- > **Gains in more inclusive accountability are feasible but are often met with resistance:** In challenging existing discriminatory norms around gender and specific population groups, it is to be expected that some may be unwilling or unable to engage in ambitious agendas around norm and behaviour change. However, in IAAAP, different approaches have been deployed with some success, including with management structures in informal settlements for IDPs, highlighting that informal settlement managers (ISM) who are involved in gatekeeping practices can be effectively engaged to support inclusive accountability if framed in the right terms.

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<sup>1</sup> See page 21 for a glossary explaining terms used throughout.

**> Careful risk analysis and GESI-aware political economy analysis (PEA) is**

**essential:** Gender and inclusion issues, and accountability reform, may be neglected by powerful groups who do not want the status quo to be threatened. As part of a 'do no harm' agenda, it is crucial to use careful risk analysis to build a nuanced understanding of the incentives and legitimacy of these different groups. In addition, a more integrated approach to gender and inclusion needs to be considered early on within the PEA, rather than as a bolt-on. IAAAP shows that engaging with rights-holders substantively from the start, and then bringing duty-bearers into the equation afterwards, has proven successful across several projects.

**> A nuanced understanding of diversity and difference is required:** There are important differences in perceptions and experiences of accountability among diverse marginalised groups, ranging from varying levels of social media engagement to scepticism around clan leadership across different groups. It is important to move away from a one-size-fits-all approach to civic engagement and recognise a variety of different needs and approaches, including tailored capacity development support, through to the provision of transport for people with disabilities.

**> Ongoing and flexible donor investment allows partners to explore pathways that can sustain gains in accountability over the longer-term:** Localised interventions offer a wealth of opportunities to incentivise champions and overcome spoiler networks, but they cannot build momentum for change at multiple levels unless sustained over time. IAAAP partners emphasised major concerns over the legacy of the programme, given the short timelines for their action-research initiatives.

# 1. Introduction

The Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme (IAAAP) is an action-research initiative, funded by UK Aid, to test what may or may not work to strengthen accountability in Somalia. IAAAP is managed on behalf of DFID by BMB Mott Macdonald, in partnership with Social Development Direct (SDDirect). IAAAP partners have conducted action research and tested models for greater accountability in Somalia. The programme was conceived as an innovation lab and as an experiment in adaptive programming. After three years of operation, IAAAP has produced ground-breaking evidence and analysis, and has generated a unique body of data, on the underlying political economy of accountability issues in Somalia. Some of this work offers insights into the nexus between accountability, gender inequality and social inclusion in the Somali context.

**Gender and inclusion-sensitive programming in fragile contexts has a long way to go.** International evidence shows that there are blind spots across development agencies, donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in understanding how issues of gender and inclusion play out and interact in fragile and conflict-affected state (FCAS) settings, and how they specifically influence accountability processes (OECD, 2017; Risby & Todd, 2012). While donors have produced or sponsored various tools to promote gender equality and social inclusion, there has been a limited focus on developing strategies to systematically incorporate these considerations in FCAS contexts. Multi-sectoral donor initiatives implemented in FCAS settings often involve discrete gender projects, rather than genuine gender mainstreaming. Gender and inclusion initiatives in FCAS environments have also tended to have a technical, rather than, political focus and have typically not been linked to the broader state building agenda.

**Blind spots in the development community have resulted in demands for a shift in perspective from many different quarters.** OECD (2017) calls for the elimination of these blind spots, particularly with regard to the ways in which gender inequality and patriarchal norms and practices shape conflict, fragility and accountability, towards “an understanding of gender, conflict and fragility that is deeper, wider, and more politically informed” (OECD, 2017: 15). Learning from practitioners and thought leaders working on gender inequality suggests that more effective and transformative programming in fragile contexts requires more systematic integration of gender and social inclusion (GESI) into political economy analyses (PEAs) and conflict analyses (Haines & O’Neil, 2018).

**IAAAP has gone some way in addressing gaps around gender and social inclusion in FCAS settings.** The programme has produced ground-breaking evidence and analysis, generating a unique body of data on the underlying political economy of accountability issues in Somalia. Some of this work offers insights into the nexus between accountability, gender inequality and social inclusion in the Somali context (see for example McCullough and Saeed, 2017). Building on these findings, this paper focuses on the specific contribution of non-state actors to more inclusive and gender-sensitive accountability. The paper draws on material from IAAAP partners over the entirety of the programme, as well as from the literature (both global and on Somalia), much of which has been condensed into a much longer theory of change (ToC) report for IAAAP.

## 2. Setting the scene: Accountability and gender in the Somali context

### **Somali society is characterised by entrenched gender inequality at all levels.**

Evaluations of the work of European Union (EU) institutions and European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) partners in Somalia show that despite a recognition of gender issues and their inclusion in project design, there is still a lack of clarity about how to best approach and address the specific needs of women and ensure gender equality, leading to limited results (Norad Evaluation Department, 2017). A gender-focused review of the Somali Compact could only demonstrate a 'patchy' impact on gender outcomes at best (ODI, 2017). Many impact evaluations on what works in efforts to advance gender equality – including, for example, women's participation in key governance structures – are not yet conclusive. There is a continuing need for high quality research that yields recommendations for practical action (Grown et al., 2016).

### **A wide range of other population groups, including women and girls –face exclusion and highly discriminatory social norms.**

These groups include internally displaced persons (IDPs), Persons with Disability (PwD), people from minority clans, and youth – often resulting in multiple layers and burdens of discrimination (as the analytical framework of 'intersectionality' aims to explore - see Crenshaw, 1989 for the first use of the term.). Although patterns of marginalisation are not static, Gardner and El-Bushra (2017: 7) argue that harmful norms around masculinity and clan superiority are still heavily embedded in Somali culture, regardless of changing political circumstances:



“Men and women from the traditionally marginalized groups are socially and politically powerless and vulnerable to exploitation and brutality, to a far greater degree than they were during the Siyad Barre state. The study highlights the lower position that even non-minority group men occupy within their own clan family when they fail to live up to expectations or fail to successfully navigate the normative male trajectory. Nevertheless, the study also shows men from so-called majority clans, can gain status if their economic productivity is restored, unlike men from marginalized groups, whose subordinate position is for life.”

### **Weak accountability and poor governance tend to characterise much of the Somali state apparatus, and emerging evidence suggests that the negative impact of this deficit is experienced most acutely by marginalised groups.**

For example, a survey carried out in 2018 by one of IAAAP's partners, Altai, found that knowledge of formal institutions and civic engagement levels are relatively high, but significantly lower for groups such as IDPs and those with lower levels of education. The survey also found that women, IDPs, the urban poor and those with limited levels of education, who all report significantly lower levels of knowledge about formal governance and accountability institutions than other respondents. Respondents who are IDPs and with lower levels of education appear to be significantly less involved in civic activities than their counterparts. Other IAAAP action-research highlights how this accountability deficit and inequality is evident in the question of land rights and ownership – a deeply contested issue in Somalia, with a lack of accountability having a heavy impact on women and minority clans (ADR, 2018).

**Youth, women, and IDPs report high degrees of alienation and powerlessness in the political system, which contributes to feelings of frustration, disconnection, and hopelessness** (Hufnaan, 2018). Men dominate the current political system in Somalia, reflecting the deeply entrenched patriarchal norms and traditions of clan-based Somali society. Patriarchal norms combine with and a gendered division of labour and the dominance of clan elders (who are male) to severely limit women's political participation. Although women exercise some 'invisible power' within the household and have an increasing profile as business owners, their political power remains weak and compromised. Overall, despite modest increases in the numbers of women represented within the formal political space (in part connected to the introduction of a parliamentary gender quota in 2016), women continue to be seriously under-represented in government structures and are largely excluded from positions of leadership and influence.

This general situation is also reflected in the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland, where there is still no quota in place despite concerted advocacy efforts on the part of civil society actors over many decades (Parke et al., 2017). However, efforts continue to try and shift this pattern. A range of civil society organisations (CSOs) work to advance the interests, and civic participation, of populations that are marginalised in the current system, such as women and youth. In the drive towards One Person One Vote (OPOV) for the elections in 2020, youth-focused CSOs have an excellent opportunity to capitalise on the energy and sheer number of young people and, in the process, to amplify the voices of young people across the country (Hufnaan, 2018: 15) – a unique opportunity from an accountability perspective.

**Given the particularly severe constraints to accountability experienced by certain parts of the population, which structures or mechanisms can promote greater accountability for excluded groups?** Drawing on global literature, including from the Somali context, and evidence generated by IAAAP partners,<sup>2</sup> this paper brings together emerging learning around mechanisms that can deliver more inclusive accountability – for women and girls, minority clans, IDPs, PwDs and other identity groups facing acute challenges in accessing accountability. Due to the scarcity of evidence from the Somali context, the paper includes evidence related to other fragile and conflict affected-states.

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<sup>2</sup> In IAAAP, partners who have had an explicit inclusion lens have tended to focus on minority clans, rather than other identity groups, leading to a greater emphasis on this issue in this paper.

# 3. Advancing more inclusive accountability: The role of non-state champions and ‘spoilers’

## Identifying accountability champions

Evidence from IAAAP shows that despite an environment defined by a lack of accountability, some actors do strive for better governance and more accountability at different levels, in both formal and informal institutions, and have a role to play in the pursuit of accountability. Among the various stakeholders engaged through IAAAP, however, only a few have focused *explicitly* on improved gender equality and social inclusion outcomes.

**Insights from international literature show that it is helpful to identify local actors as champions, who are ‘reform-minded’, perceived as genuine representatives of certain groups, and who have the skills, knowledge or experience to play a facilitative role** (Tembo & Chapman, 2014). As catalysts, interlocutors or advocates, these groups or individuals are crucial to making sustainable change.

**However, supporting these champions to bring about positive change is a highly sensitive and risky approach.** Care must be taken to avoid the impression that the legitimacy of champions is derived neither from external nor international sources. Links with external agencies seen to represent ‘foreign’ or alien interests can delegitimise local actors and make them politically vulnerable (Roche et al., 2018). In the experience of IAAAP, champions are vulnerable to the spoiler networks that remain powerful in Somalia – and will continue to remain so in a fragile state environment where spoiler networks control vast resources. Without long-term support, it is unlikely that these individuals can continue to champion change in the long run.

**Many IAAAP projects have sought to support increased accountability by working with institutions that are not always accountable to all members of the community they represent.** The prevailing conventions and power dynamics around clan elders, for example, exclude women, youth and PwD, and disadvantage minority clans. Yet these non-state actors, and the clan institutions of which they are part, are powerful and will persist in Somalia for the foreseeable future. While the inclusion of informal actors, such as elders, in the governance system in Somalia is not necessarily more conducive to inclusive and accountable governance, it does represent a reasonable way of drawing on existing power bases to build support for the Federal Government of Somalia (McCullough & Saed, 2017). Many partners are working explicitly to improve the accountability of non-state actors, such as elders – for example, by identifying champions and reformers within clan and traditional leadership structures (IAAAP Strategic Learning Event Report 2018). However, there continues to be a lack of consensus on how to work with non-state actors across the development sector.

### 3.1 Clan elders

**Although highly influential, clan elders are notoriously challenging to work with from a gender and inclusion perspective, as their very identity and position rests upon a set of widely held beliefs that uphold the superiority of men and of majority clans.** Nevertheless, their influential status makes them key players within the accountability space and gives them centre stage within many of the political economy analyses (PEAs) conducted by IAAAP partners. In Altai's recent survey, clan elders score relatively lower in terms of positive perceptions of how accountable they are – especially among women. However, clan structured were the most popular response for who people turn to when seeking to overcome an obstacle – possibly due to the lack of other viable alternatives (Altai, 2018: 10). A similar tension is flagged by McCullough and Saeed (2017: 14) who find that working with elders from minority clans could “mitigate some exclusion at the clan level but if those elders are self-inaugurated, projects risk supporting increasing exclusion at the community level.” The same paper notes that “elders are likely to play an ongoing role in Somalia's hybrid governance system, but they can only advance accountability if they become more accountable themselves” (26) and offers a salutary warning: “Programme staff need to be cautious about claims of empowerment among elders. If those elders represent only a select group within a community, efforts to empower elders in the name of accountability may be self-defeating” (McCullough & Saeed, 2017: 14).

The scoping study for IAAAP identified that while **“clanisation of politics exacerbates and drives nepotism and corruption; clan structures can play both positive and negative roles in relation to corruption and harnessing positive impacts”**(Coffey International Development, 2013: 13) There is limited evidence available examining women's role within the Somali clan system, including the dual connections of women to their clan of birth as well as their clan of marriage. On the one hand this may offer women opportunity to have influence in the political arena. Philips (2013) highlights that women activists are said to have played a key role in Somaliland's political settlement - specifically, he notes that the ability of women to “cross clan lines” through intermarriage was an important factor in organising Somaliland's clan-based conferences, which consolidated the rules for building and maintaining peace Jama (2010) has also asserted that a woman's multiple clan affiliations can give her a structural role as a peacebuilder, facilitating dialogue between warring parties and exerting pressure on them to keep talking. In contrast, women can also be seen as unreliable clan representatives in political office because of their dual affiliations (see Parke et al., 2017).

**The experience of one IAAAP partner, KATUNI, who worked with local elders, successfully led to a shift towards greater inclusion.** The Council of Elders established as part of this project was “more inclusive of a wider group of clans which ultimately provided more minority clans with direct access to the district administration. Before the establishment of the Council of Elders, most of the contact between Dhobley Administration and elders had been with the elders of the two dominant sub-clans” (McCullough & Saeed, 2017: 14).

**However, “business people and clan elders are very often cited as both potential supporters of accountability and ‘spoilers’** (Altai, 2018: 33). In comparison to male survey respondents, female respondents rated duty bearers as less accountable, because clan elders are primarily accountable to male clan members, and women are mostly excluded from the elders' decision-making process (Ibid: 36).

The role of elders within the OPOV movement – a movement that, by creating a system that gives equal weight to each person's vote, is critical to the inclusion agenda – is significant (See box to the right).

## One person one vote (OPOV): Reconciling electoral systems with gender norms

Research by the Hufnaan Network, a group of Somali accountability actors formed in 2016 as result of their involvement in IAAAP, uncovered widespread concerns about how OPOV principles can be blended with the traditional *xeer* under the authority of Somali clan elders. The inclusion and exclusion of women is a particular issue of concern. Female research participants stated that traditional leaders expect women to obey decisions made by men from their clan. Various structural beliefs and justifications are given by some informants as to why women are excluded from the traditional leader positions: their membership of two different clans, by blood and marriage; their roles as housewives and bearers of children and being viewed as not strong enough to defend the clan's interest.

A common opinion among the research participants is that even after OPOV is successfully implemented in 2021, informal political systems will continue to operate in the country and that the influence and role of traditional leaders will be needed. It is therefore essential to strategise about the part traditional leaders can play in OPOV. It will be necessary to navigate between utilising the influential role of traditional leaders and mitigating the effects of patriarchal norms and views that are contrary to the objectives of OPOV, such as their exclusionary views about women's participation in politics (Hufnaan, 2018).

### 3.2 Religious leaders

**Religious attitudes, beliefs and norms have a central role in determining whether and how accountability can work for all.** In the Somali context, religious norms and beliefs often constrain women's ability to participate in the public sphere, for example, beliefs that undermine women's ability or suitability to perform certain tasks or to adopt leadership roles (Parke et al., 2017; Grant, 2018). Inevitably, this has an impact upon women's ability to hold powerful actors and duty-bearers – and men in general – to account. Conversely, religious beliefs or teaching that support a more inclusive approach – for example, that men and women should all be educated, or that racial or ethnic equality is a more truth or ideal – could counter social norms and traditions that are inherently exclusionary.

**However, the contribution of religious leaders to more inclusive accountability in Somalia remains very unclear.** On the one hand, there are some well-documented examples of religious leaders playing a critical role in opening up traditionally male-only domain in Somalia in the elections – the ultimate accountability forum. For example, Sufist leaders openly supported the 30 per cent quota (UNSOM, 2016). A range of international and Somali evidence recognises the positive role that imams and sheikhs can play in key gendered issues such as child marriage and female genital mutilation (Tana, 2018). In contrast, as highlighted by McCullough and Saed (2017: 15-16), “the positions that Salafist groups take can promote increased accountability, but at the same time strongly support ongoing exclusion of women... by lobbying against the 30 per cent quota for women”. While it is clear how influential religious leaders can be, these divergent examples demonstrate some of the complexities of working with these actors.

**Although IAAAP partners have had some experience of engaging with religious leaders, only one example scrutinises the potential contribution of this group to more inclusive (or conversely, exclusionary) forms of accountability.** Tana Copenhagen's work with imams in IDP camps is a positive example of engaging religious leaders to champion change. Tana identified several imams who were willing to be champions and join the gender equality groups to raise awareness on female genital mutilation (FGM), gender-based violence (GBV) and child marriage. The local imam inaugurated all sessions by citing the Quran and explaining how these practices were not endorsed by the Quran. In all cases, commitments to change were made by the people participating in the events (Tana, 2018).

**Although religious leaders are clearly recognised by IAAAP partners as critical change-leaders, it is notable that no other IAAAP partners have worked with religious leaders to further a GESI agenda.** In different learning fora, many IAAAP partners have emphasised the key role that religious leaders can play in championing the rights, roles and responsibilities of women to participate in public spaces – be that in politics or in more general public debate. However, the lack of evidence emerging from IAAAP in this regard is a testament to the sensitivity and challenges of how to effectively engage religious leaders to advance inclusive accountability.

### 3.3 ‘Insiders’: Political champions

**Stakeholder mapping, conducted as part of the PEAs, has been crucial to identify champions and how they operate within ‘the rules of the game’.** PEAs conducted by IAAAP partners have tracked both political players and networks, as well as other insiders. Occupying a curious middle ground between the state and non-state, ex-politicians or civil servants are well-placed to understand and navigate the systems, but they are no longer bound by the political constraints they may once have faced in office.

**The involvement of three former mayors in SORADI’s accountability forum in Hargeisa proved crucial to achieving the project objectives.** For both the municipal and community level fora, SORADI conducted a stakeholder mapping to identify champions, developed criteria for selection and took great care to ensure diversity across members of the fora. Among the members of its multi-stakeholder accountability forum, SORADI and community partners were careful to include people with a deep insider knowledge of how the political system functions, namely, three former mayors. By teaming them with a range of diverse representatives from across civil society and the private sector, the Forum was able to advocate for issues that include better representation of minority clans, gender budgeting and key areas where women’s interests have been overlooked (Grant, 2018).

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“Decision-making within the ‘black box’ of Government can be complex and opaque. ‘Insiders’ who understand how the system works are often essential in understanding and providing the right entry points. SORADI engaged former politicians and well-connected advisors within the Forum to help navigate the way” (Grant, 2018: 17).



### 3.4 Informal settlement managers or ‘gatekeepers’

**Informal settlement managers (ISMs), also known as ‘gatekeepers’, manage the IDP camps in and around Mogadishu,** and have a controversial reputation and profile. According to the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2012: 183), gatekeepers are “sophisticated networks of interference: individuals and organisations who position themselves to harness humanitarian assistance flows for their own personal or political advantage”. At the same time, ISMs are a fact of life, fulfilling a role that is not currently played by either government or aid agencies. Although they continue to deal with ISMs, donor agencies have tended not to acknowledge or publicly recognise ISMs owing to their potential capacity to do harm with gatekeeping practices (e.g. abusive relations with camp residents, corruption etc.).

**Outside of IAAAP, the literature does not provide any insight into the capacity of ISMs to strengthen inclusive forms of accountability in the camp communities that they control.** However, McCullough and Saeed (2017: 15) argue that, “As an institution, gatekeepers are in some ways more inclusive and less bound by tradition than the institution of elders, and as a result, offer opportunities for women to gain positions of power: many gatekeepers in Mogadishu are women (Tana estimates that 30-40% of gatekeepers are women)”.

**Through IAAAP, Tana engaged closely with the ISMs to explore their potential to strengthen inclusive accountability around some highly gendered issues** female genital mutilation (FGM), gender-based violence (GBV) and child marriage (CM). Tana facilitated the formation of informal settlement monitoring committees, which consist of ISMs, District Commissioners and representatives of the IDPs themselves. These committees were tasked with ensuring that there is a reporting mechanism for violation of IDP rights and a system for addressing reported violations. In Altai’s survey, 37% of IDP respondents identify camp managers as potential supporters of accountability (more than any other duty bearer mentioned), a finding that reiterates the need to include ISMs in the informal settlement monitoring committees.

**Tana’s reporting outlines positive outcomes of working with ISMs to bring about inclusive change.** They describe how, following the training in human rights, gender equality and humanitarian principles, informal settlement managers initiated awareness-raising sessions within their camps and began liaising more with settlement committees (Tana, 2018). Female informal settlement managers also participated in the training, adding to their legitimacy as holders of power within a patriarchal society (ibid.). The prominence of some women in ISM roles opens up the possibility for increased female participation in decision-making than is typical in Somali customary governance systems, and the potential for improved accountability of governance structures for women in general (McCullough & Saeed, 2017: 19).

**Exploring how ISMs can play a role in contributing to more inclusive accountability processes is certainly an area that merits further investigation.** Because of Tana’s work with ISMs, more international donors have started thinking about their own engagement with them. However, some concerns remain about the significance and weight of the evidence from the Accountability in Informal Settlements project given the relatively short timeframe for implementation and the complex issues it was addressing. Nonetheless, Tana’s work with ISMs is an example which shows that, if engaged, spoilers can also become champions.

### 3.5 CSOs and NGOs

**In fragile and conflict-affected environments, there is a considerable risk that CSOs and NGOs, including the more established organisations, may be co-opted.** The international literature notes that even viable CSOs come under great pressure and can be partially or fully captured by powerful forces that are unaccountable to the people that CSOs aspire to serve. This undermines programme effectiveness and legitimacy (Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Fox, 2014; Grandvoinnet, 2015).

**There are numerous examples globally, where CSOs presented a veneer of credibility but did little to positively engage with rights-holders, particularly the most marginalised** (Gaventa & Barret, 2010; Grandvoinnet, 2015). A review of evaluations of accountability programmes found that working with non-traditional civil society groups such as social movements, trade unions and religious organisations tended to lead to better outcomes in terms of engaging and empowering marginalised groups (ODI, 2009)

**Working with CSOs does not necessarily entail a more gender-sensitive and inclusive approach – CSOs tend to reflect society around them and as such, women are often systematically under-represented.** Pierson and Thomson (2018: 107) have pointed out that it is important to target civil society fora in efforts to ensure the inclusion of women's voices and to distribute political power more evenly as "women's activism in divided societies tends to reside in civil society, not formal politics ... it is most often in civil society where we see calls for rights as women."

**CSOs and NGOs can play an important part in promoting inclusive accountability, but there is also cause for concern about the role of international NGOs operating in Somalia.** Somali NGOs, such as SORADI, have made concerted and relatively successful efforts in their work to promote wider and deeper inclusion of women and minorities (Grant, 2018), as did some of the international NGOs, such as BBC Media Action and consulting firms such as Tana. Nevertheless, IAAAP partners expressed scepticism towards international NGOs, who highlighted the international community's lack of engagement on issues of corruption, for example, which they perceived to have resulted in an "entrenching" of existing power structures, "including unrepresentative, unaccountable politicians, officials and clan leaders" (IAAAP Strategic Learning Report 2018). Wider evidence has also emphasised that complex local realities are often not sufficiently considered in international efforts to build more inclusive societies and (gender) equality in contexts like Somalia (see Horst, 2017).

Whatever the limitations of CSOs and NGOs, it is notable that young people are significantly more likely to mention CSOs or NGOs as potential supporters of accountability. Relative to other duty bearers, IDPs tend to rate NGOs (both local and international) as significantly more accountable than other respondents (Altai, 2018: 36).

### 3.6 Spoilers

**At the core of continued unaccountability in Somalia is the ability of spoilers to control the situation at various levels.** The identity of spoilers vary depending on the issue under consideration and geographical location, and their strength varies over time. From a GESI perspective, understanding spoilers' interests in maintaining the status quo – including existing exclusionary and discriminatory structures – is fundamental. For example, Altai's accountability survey found that IDPs, minority clans and women appeared to be particularly vulnerable to interference from duty bearers when pursuing accountability (Altai, 2018).

#### Perceptions of spoilers

There are few significant differences between the perceptions of men and women when it comes to identifying potential supporters or spoilers, except for the fact that women are overall less likely to say that any actor would exert pushback against an accountability organisation. In; in particular, women are significantly less likely to believe that NGOs would exert pushback against an accountability organisation (they are 5 percentage points less likely to think that both international NGOs and local NGOs would exert 'serious' or 'some' pushback). Women are also significantly less likely to identify camp managers as potential supporters of accountability.

*Altai Survey 2018*

**The ability for IAAAP project partners to successfully navigate spoiler dynamics was dependent, in part, on effective PEA that continued through implementation.**

In a rapidly changing environment, this continual contextual analysis was instrumental in understanding, and responding to, changing spoiler dynamics. By itself, however, PEA does not yield sustained change. Robust evidence and PEA, when properly employed and regularly revisited, is central to overcoming spoiler dynamics, but it remains unclear how the efforts can: 1) be sustained over time; and 2) affect change outside of a narrow context.

**Targeted advocacy, GESI training and civic education can help to overcome barriers and pushback from local authorities who are reluctant to engage marginalised groups in dialogue and activism.**

In the several multi-stakeholder platforms and forums facilitated by IAAAP partners, there have been ‘spoilers’ who do not understand the reason for including women or clan minorities in these spaces. For example, GLOPPI reported resistance from local authorities who did not want the project team to mobilise and consult sub-groups of women and other excluded groups. In particular, religious leaders and elders were not comfortable with meeting and discussing communal issues with women and youth. Social norms dictated that women and men should be separated rather than gathered together in the same meeting. In some instances, it was regarded as an insult for an elder to sit with a woman or a young person (GLOPPI, 2018a). It took time to explain that the project’s objective was to engage a broader range of social groups – not just the main clan and not just men. After investing time in advocacy, GESI training and civic education among stakeholders to build awareness of the need for more inclusive engagement, GLOPPI was able to create space for more inclusive dialogue and successful mobilisation of women, youth, and clan minorities (GLOPPI, 2018b). GLOPPI also found that it was more effective to mobilise these more marginalised groups into their different sub-groups first, as this built their confidence and enabled them to identify their issues and support the election of a representative to join a broader dialogue and accountability fora.

**Evidence from the IAAAP shows that using non-confrontational approaches when engaging with potential spoilers is critical.**

Despite the frustrations and sense of outrage that surfaced in interviews carried out for a recent case study of SORADI’s multi-stakeholder Reform Forum, Forum members try to ensure that their approaches are evidence-based, well-documented and professionally managed (Grant, 2018). This echoes how GLOPPI worked with local authorities, as highlighted above.

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“After some time, women began taking the lead of many activities..{..}..Women’s self-confidence has significantly increased after they successfully carried out campaigns in Tog-wajake and Aarabsiyo”  
(GLOPPIa: 3)

**Evidence from Somalia shows that an understanding of women’s involvement in spoiler networks, and in overcoming them, is important.**

However, to date, a gender lens has not been applied systematically to the analysis of spoiler networks in Somalia. Women play complex roles in armed conflicts globally; they are not only victims in conflicts or peace activists, but are also actively engaged in combat roles, as political actors, as providers of healthcare, food and safe houses to combatants, as gatherers of intelligence, and as a source of radicalisation for the next generation (USAID 2015; UN Women, 2015; Bandarage, 2010).

Spoilers are motivated by different drivers and perpetuate exclusion and discrimination in different ways. Those who may be discriminatory towards women could still have an agenda that promotes a more inclusive approach with regards to minority clans, or IDPs, for example. The Tana project described earlier, is an interesting example of an initiative in which those who are generally considered to be spoilers could be incentivised to promote greater voice and agency for women and youth – and thus inclusive accountability. How viable or sustainable such approaches are over time, without external support, remains a question.

# 4. Addressing accountability for women and marginalised groups: Approaches and mechanisms

In addition to the champions and ‘spoilers’ discussed in the previous section, it is important to understand the approaches and mechanisms that have shown potential to open up or extend accountability pathways for marginalised groups. In this section, we review IAAAP findings about some of these opportunities. It should be noted that this review draws on materials and reports from IAAAP partners and the approaches they have tested, but it is not a ‘systematic review’ of wider evidence from Somalia.

## 4.1 Multi-stakeholder fora

### **IAAAP partners inspired or facilitated the establishment of several multi-stakeholder accountability platforms and forums to connect rights-holders and duty-bearers.**

Puntland State University (PSU), GLOPPI and SORADI, for example, all developed such platforms, each with their own distinct model and ways of working, to help advance accountability for *all*. The global literature provides a useful reminder that creating platforms, or building awareness of rights, does not necessarily mean women will engage or demand accountability; women tend to be the ones less likely to think they will have an influence on the accountability process, and are therefore less likely to engage (Sharma, 2009). IAAAP partners, such as SORADI whose forum included women, minorities, activists, politicians, media and businesses, have highlighted the importance of a diverse member base to bring a wider range of voices and perspectives, more contacts and greater legitimacy.

**Highlighting common markers of vulnerability among minority groups helps to create a common framework for discussion.** For SORADI’s training of youth from minority groups, clan identity and a sense of shared grievance appear to have created a common framework for discussion that transcended gender differences. While dividing such a group into male and female youth is often recommended as a way of ensuring that all voices are heard, the (male) trainer was convinced that having a mixed group did not constrain participation of young women because the overall focus was on the rights and empowerment of the minority clan, thereby creating a shared identity with which all could engage and relate (Grant, 2018).

**Among rights-holders, a sense of unity within groups – where previously there was more of a focus on divisions – was an important ingredient for sustained engagement.** For marginalised groups, this is a tremendously powerful approach, as it provides an opportunity to scale up their voice and agency. An optimism was borne out of collective action when it had a target, whether that referred to improving local government service delivery in Hargeisa or reducing violence in IDP camps in Kismayo or Mogadishu. There was also a sense among rights holders that, even if the victories were small and perhaps ephemeral, they had shown that organisations and pressure could effect change. Optimism was dampened by setbacks and the knowledge that spoiler networks needed to be challenged on multiple fronts (and were not). However, these examples confirm a finding from Altai (2018) whose survey suggested that people do organise to effect local change when they have developed a sense of common purpose and a sense of possibilities through collective action.

**Despite lacking access and opportunity to participation, marginalised groups do find ways to unite and engage in local activities and discussions.** For example, in Altai's recent survey (2018), youth were very well represented in 'community action groups', youth groups accounted for around a quarter of the groups mentioned (Altai, 2018).<sup>3</sup> 'Community action groups' appear, therefore, to be a very promising way of engaging youth, although it is not clear whether such groups can be channelled easily towards the accountability agenda and a focus on young people's interests. In contrast, IDPs are significantly less likely to be members of community action groups, both compared to the rest of the sample (10% versus 17%) and the urban poor specifically (26%) (Altai, 2018: 26). With respect to protest marches, the urban poor and the youth are more likely to be involved than their peers. Findings from the Altai survey also indicate that women do not appear to be significantly less involved in civic activities than men, except for membership to community action groups in Somaliland. However, one should keep in mind that the civic activities listed here do not equate to influence, voice or equal participation (Altai, 2018: 29) and that the sample size for the survey was relatively small.

## 4.2 Media

Available research highlights the role of **mass media as a force for persuasion and as an institution that can address coordination problems among citizens beyond information alone** (Cornwall, 2016). Likewise, within IAAAP, diverse and tailored communication has proven to be valuable in ensuring inclusive approaches to accountability.

### 4.2.1 Radio and television

**BBC Media Action implemented a project focusing explicitly on media's role in strengthening inclusive accountability.** The project included radio and television dialogue and talk shows, involving citizens and duty-bearers. In their IAAAP reporting, BBC Media Action argued that, based on the evidence of its action-research project, mass media is a highly accessible way of helping illustrate how women can participate in accountability, with potentially wide outreach (Grant & Haegeman, 2017).

**Effective inclusion in media-based accountability mechanisms requires support to and preparation for those involved so they can make the most of opportunities to be heard.** Lower levels of access to information and participation among women and excluded groups result in limited knowledge and lower levels of confidence and trust. In turn, this inhibits the engagement of women and excluded groups with other stakeholders in broader platforms where power and dominant social norms are at play. Social barriers to voice and participation need to be addressed directly; offering a one-off chance to be heard or participate in multi-stakeholder dialogue does not automatically unblock pathways to accountability.

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<sup>3</sup> "It can be noted that the concept of 'community action group' used here is quite broad, so membership/affiliation to a community group is not necessarily the same as community action or active citizenship. Still, 80% of groups mentioned were involved in community actions last year, most frequently in public consultations/forums, but also in fundraising and public service" (Altai, 2018: 25).

To address these barriers, BBC Media Action selected and trained 40 people to be active members of an audience for a pilot debate show, including young people, people of different education levels, elders, women, members of CSOs, business owners and village committee members. The training lasted for two days and developed participants' skills in asking appropriate and effective questions. BBC Media Action then continued to provide orientation sessions before the recording of the debate show to encourage marginalised groups in the studio audiences to ask questions. Findings and experience from BBC Media Action confirm that building these soft skills is useful to empowering women and other excluded groups to participate meaningfully in accountability debates and policy dialogue.

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"It is better than other programmes because the government officials have been questioned in this programme and the community members also ask questions, so I would say it has to continue."

**FGD participant in Borama, aged 18-45 and living with disability, viewer of Horn Cable TV programme (BBC Media Action, 2018: 13)**



**Media has a role to play in bridging the gap between rights-holder and duty-bearers by providing a platform for discussion.**

Few media programmes provide the space for citizens to hold their leaders to account and so, the two TV and one radio programmes developed through the BBC Media Action project offered unique formats in which ordinary citizens could interact directly with those in positions of power, raise issues of concern and question their leaders (BBC Media Action, 2018). The use of interactive formats and a range of platforms has been shown to be effective in increasing the meaningful participation of marginalised groups. Participants who watched or listened to one of BBC Media Action's three programmes reported diversity in the audiences, although it seems that people with disabilities (PWD) were less represented than others – and on "seeing or hearing different types of community members 'like them' question leaders..." they were "...encouraged...to feel that they themselves could also question leaders....[...].the show also taught people how to ask questions (BBC Media Action, 2018: 4 and 16).

Participants reported that the programmes were able to address issues of direct concern to the communities such as education, unemployment and transportation. On the other hand, some participant feedback indicates that there could have been more coverage of issues related to minority groups, particularly issues of direct concern to PwDs. Suggestions were made to address this gap, including provision of support to physically transport PwDs to the shows as well as identification of individual PwDs with the skills to present issues on behalf of others living with disabilities. Women were also not always perceived as being as involved in the talk show discussions as men (BBC Media Action, 2018). These findings show that providing opportunities to engage also needs more concerted efforts to ensure barriers to active participation are removed.

**Radio appears to be the most promising media channel for accountability in the Somali context.**

Among the media sources listed, radio was the most used by most respondents, including the most vulnerable, is considered more trustworthy and is thought to be an effective tool for holding duty bearers to account (Altai, 2018: 33). Radio also seems to be the most promising media source to be used as a channel for supporting community-based accountability actions, based on its perceived trustworthiness, ability to hold duty bearers to account, and the percentage of people who use it (both TV and radio rank high against the first two criteria (Altai, 2018: 10).

**Radio also appears to be the best media source for reaching the most vulnerable.** Only 53% of respondents identifying as IDPs and urban poor had accessed Somali television in the previous 12 months, compared to 85% for other respondents.

The high levels of public trust in television and radio is reflected in other sources of evidence, including a report by Africa's Voices Foundation which analysed the perspectives of people in Kismayo and Baidoa gathered through SMS responses to radio broadcasts. The report noted that "[i]nteractive radio is a viable tool for hearing the voices of Somali people from different demographic groups" (Altai 2018: 40).

#### 4.2.2. Online media

**Several IAAAP projects used online platforms, particularly social media, to support their work.** Available evidence on IAAAP-supported online platforms suggests that there was strong outreach to Somalis nationally and internationally, with high levels of traffic to these websites. Transparency Solutions (TSOL, 2017), used findings from their political economy and network analysis of the Federal Parliament, to set up a database of all MPs and Senators in Somalia's Federal Parliament (see [www.wakiil.org](http://www.wakiil.org)). The project has extended to information on voting records and parliamentary activities and has a large social media following. However, analytics show much greater usage by men than women, suggesting that while social media may broaden reach, marginalised groups often have less access to social media and other digital tools. Next steps proposed by TSOL include efforts to strengthen the role of female candidates and MPs, possibly including a platform for female MPs to engage and promote their ideas, media engagement to effect change in attitudes, and prioritising gender issues in Parliament.

The experience of IAAAP's partner, **SORADI, confirms the fundamental relevance of social media as a mechanism for accountability** (Grant, 2018). SORADI's own Facebook page streamed one capacity-building event to more than 8,000 followers – a considerable outreach that proves the potential to increase exponentially the impact of such events and generate critical mass. Both young people and Reform Forum members emphasised the relevance of the media. As one Forum member noted, "media really helps to persuade people.... If we air urgent issues in the media – social media and regular media – it's really important. Everyone watches and listens to the media".

**Efforts to promote OPOV should take full advantage of the wide variety of media platforms that are utilised in Somalia.** With its growing popularity among Somalis, particularly among young people, social media should be used to promote OPOV through content creation, message promotion, dialogues and debates. The variety of media platforms and their geographic distribution offers opportunities to tailor and target messages to specific populations and creatively to match the message to specific demographics (Hufnaan, 2019: 25).

### 4.3 Civic education and public outreach

**Evidence indicates there is citizen reluctance (particularly from women and other more marginalised groups) to challenge duty-bearers because of fear of intimidation or backlash, and because of a belief that citizens cannot influence things.**

Mobilisation for collective action depends on many variables: citizen capacity, willingness to engage, organisational and managerial skills, an ability to access resources, technical skills and knowledge, an ability to build and maintain support and alliances, an ability to adapt, an ability to self-renew and the ability to engage in collective action for the long-term. A belief that citizens can control or influence things, shaped in turn by experience and repeated accountability interactions, is especially important (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2016).

**There is a lack of demand for accountability despite an increasing sense of frustration at the community level.** Discussions in a 2017 IAAAP peer learning workshop highlighted the importance of understanding how different people, in different communities, view accountability and how they view their ability to influence accountability. A wide range of partners called for a stronger focus on working with communities to build awareness of citizens' rights, promote civic education (and stimulate stronger demand for accountability (see: IAAAP, 2016a; IAAAP, 2016b).

**A range of methods have been employed to address the lack of community demand for accountability,** including civic education and public outreach as well as GESI-sensitive strategies for mobilising diverse stakeholders in informal settings. For example, as Haegeman and Grant (2017) highlight, meetings in traditional and informal settings encourage broader participation and allowed participants to drop in and out as they wish – ensuring that those who may have other tasks to attend to during the day, such as women, have the opportunity to engage as they are available and around household tasks such as fetching water and preparing meals.

**IAAAP partners have tested new ways to connect rights-holders with duty-bearers.**

A recent case study on SORADI shows that people in Hargeisa are frustrated by poor governance, but many are unaware of their rights, how local government functions, or how to seek accountability (Grant, 2018). This reality underpinned SORADI's efforts to link community members with duty-bearers in Hargeisa Local Council through the formation of accountability fora. Although it is too early to measure impact, there is some initial evidence showing that one local forum is providing a platform for outreach and awareness-raising amongst the highly marginalised Gabooye clan in GacanLibah.

**Positive case studies, demonstrating how women and minority groups have engaged with decision-makers to bring about change, can increase people's confidence and belief that they can make a difference, and can stimulate community demand for accountability.** For example, GLOPPI found that the communities they had engaged through their initial research process were able to identify gaps in governance and accountability in their locality and thereafter started to recognise that they too had a role to play. This recognition motivated them to start engaging with the local and central authorities (GLOPPI, 2016).

**The Hufnaan Network will continue to use public outreach and citizen awareness-raising strategies, developed by IAAAP partners, as part of their efforts under the OPOV initiative.** Hufnaan’s flagship project focuses on enhancing efforts to achieve elections based on universal suffrage in Somalia by 2021. With the recognition that civic education and public outreach are necessary to achieve meaningful change in this regard, the Network plans to advance OPOV by increasing public understanding of the electoral systems: encouraging public debate on elections; enhancing the capacity of key accountability stakeholders in Somalia; and carrying out Somali-led research on corrupt practices and their social, economic, and political ramifications in the Somali context. Hufnaan’s next phase of work will include extensive public engagement and advocacy to strengthen the campaign, including workshops, public lectures, and debates in Puntland, Jubbaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South West, and Bannadir regions.

**Evidence shows that efforts to engage the Somali public will be critical to the success and legitimacy of the OPOV process.** Hufnaan’s PEA found that, until now, the talk about OPOV elections has been mainly between the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and the donor community. Hufnaan (2018: 20) states that “there has been little engagement with the public and many research participants stated that they are becoming suspicious about the ‘collusion’ between the unaccountable, corrupt Somali politicians in the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) and the international donor community”. According to the Hufnaan Network members, for citizens to participate fully in OPOV, civic education and public outreach must start early.

**Creativity and targeting of outreach approaches is recognised as essential, with social media identified as a promising platform for engaging youth.** Hufnaan (2018: 25) notes that:

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“A concerted effort to inform and engage Somali citizens across the country on these topics in innovative, contextually relevant ways is needed. A particular focus of these efforts should be on currently marginalized groups including women, youth, and IDPs. Campaigns must be tailored to the particular circumstances, needs, and hopes of these populations. This could involve partnering with CSOs who are already engaged with these groups as well as hosting forums between them and relevant OPOV policymakers and government stakeholders.”



# Conclusions

**Both the international literature and the experience of IAAAP reflects the potential – and the complexity – of engaging with influential non-state actors to strengthen accountability in Somalia.**

The PEA studies produced by IAAAP partners – and the subsequent interventions based on these studies – reflect how critical or influential non-state actors can be both as champions and spoilers (sometimes both at once) in supporting a pro-accountability agenda. The small-scale, experimental and adaptive approach of IAAAP provided a valuable framework within which to explore competing interests and interactions. However, the complexity of working effectively with non-state actors brings a high degree of risk, in multiple ways, which may constrain the ability to experiment and innovate for fear of doing harm.

**Efforts to strengthen inclusive accountability can go one step further by challenging existing discriminatory norms around gender and specific population groups, such as minority clans and IDPs.**

Within IAAAP, efforts to promote inclusive accountability have been somewhat fragmented, with few examples. Few partners were willing, or able, to embrace this particular challenge in a meaningful way, limiting the evidence and learning. Nevertheless, as described earlier in this paper, there are examples of key partners that successfully engaged in this ambitious agenda, deploying different approaches and even challenging widespread scepticism. This was the case with Tana's work with ISMs, for example, and their commitment to fighting gender-based violence within the IDP camps. The evidence of what could be achieved shows how gendered political economy analysis can bring to light opportunities that might otherwise be overlooked.

**Each of the different sets of non-state actors brings different exclusionary – or inclusive – possibilities to their approach.**

While some may be open to supporting an agenda where women can play a greater role in leadership or decision making, they may nevertheless prove to be spoilers when it comes to any threat of weakening majority clan dominance. Each group is driven by a context-specific set of incentives, and their legitimacy depends on different factors that may or may not be dependent on the exclusionary nature of the status quo. A push to engage on gender and inclusion issues may actively disincentivise broader accountability reform where powerful groups feel their status may be threatened. As part of a 'Do No Harm' agenda, this highlights the need for careful risk analysis in conjunction with a more integrated approach to gender and inclusion that is considered early on within the PEA, rather than as a bolt-on.

**The ways in which different citizens perceive the role of the different groups and actors is highly variable.**

Altai (2018) sheds light on some important differences between groups – such as women's much greater scepticism about clan leaders (compared to male peers); young people's greater confidence in NGOs and (in general terms) their propensity to use social media as a platform for accountability; or how social media engagement is much more constrained for minority clans and the urban poor. These differences highlight the importance of thinking about accountability in a much more nuanced way, understanding how the perceptions and experiences of each group vary and what direct implications this has for how to reach these groups in the most effective way. This learning is clearly informing the Hufnaan Network's thinking about how to use diverse and innovative ways to promote OPOV and avoid a one-size-fits-all approach to civic engagement.

**A range of contextualised approaches were explored within the programme, varying in accessibility and reach.** Helpful pointers emerged from the Altai accountability perceptions survey (2018) regarding how people consume media in different ways – an aspect explored in some depth in BBC Media Action’s work. Citizen fora, diverse public engagement strategies and different media-based initiatives all offer the opportunity to promote inclusion, as well as accountability. The IAAAP experience underlines the importance of understanding the varied needs of the participants and directly addressing these needs (for example, through capacity-building of female audience members prior to their participation in multi-stakeholder accountability events or providing transport options for PwD). Evidence from IAAAP also highlights the necessity of adapting interventions to take into account prevailing social norms (such as the many constraints on public voice for women). Few partners examined gender and inclusion issues sufficiently in their early analyses (both the fact-finding and feasibility assessments and the foundational PEAs) and, as result, their interventions largely failed to produce a truly inclusive and systemic baseline analysis or to adopt nuanced gender and inclusion-sensitive approaches during implementation.

**Ongoing and flexible donor investment is needed if partners are to explore pathways to sustain gains in accountability.** Localised interventions offer a wealth of opportunities to incentivise champions and overcome spoiler networks, but they cannot do so unless support is sustained over time. Partners have highlighted this as a major concern for the legacy of the programme, given the short timelines for IAAAP’s action-research initiatives. In the context of a powerful disabling environment, the sustainability of partners’ work and innovations is questionable.

A single donor-funded programme, by itself, can only carve out limited space – and only in the short-term. These constraints are particularly challenging for the gender equality and social inclusion aspects of the accountability agenda. Without more sustained investment over a long period – building momentum for change across society at multiple levels – it will be extremely hard to sustain even small gains in redressing the profound deficits of voice and accountability for women and other excluded groups in Somalia. More time and space is needed to try out new ideas which prove the viability of innovative models that strengthen the enabling environment for accountability and to mobilise indigenous sources of support for gains and changes in accountability.

# Glossary of terms

Term	Definition	Reference
Accountable Governance	Accountability is the obligation of actors to take responsibility for their actions. Accountable governance can happen when citizens raise their voices, and public institutions respond to them by adjusting their policies and practices.	Brock, McGee, and Besuijen (2014)
Adaptive Management	Ripley and Jaccard (2016: 8) refer to the 'father of adaptive management' Holling in defining Adaptive Management as "a structured, iterative process of robust decision-making in the face of uncertainty, with an aim to reduce uncertainty over time via system monitoring".	Ripley and Jaccard (2016)
Adaptive Programming	<p>An approach which enables the design, delivery, management and oversight of a project where there is a conscious and systemic effort to, at all levels and on an on-going basis for the life of the project, learn about what works (and what doesn't), about changes in the political environment, and about the needs of local actors – and to adapt, in real time, strategic aspects (including theories of change, results frameworks, approaches) and operational details (e.g. systems, tools, resources, budgets) with the aim of achieving systemic and sustainable change and increased impact.</p> <p>Brinkerhoff, Frazer and McGregor-Mirghani (2018: 1) note that adaptive programme definitions vary, but that at heart they contain similar attributes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Linking adaptation and learning: They all explicitly connect learning and adaptive management.</li> <li>• Reframing project design and implementation: They shift the linear model of the traditional project cycle's three stages of design, implementation, and evaluation to a flexible sequence of repeated experimentation and adjustments based on learning.</li> <li>• Managing through flexibility-friendly structures and processes: They favour participatory collaboration with stakeholders, iterative planning and action, and incremental decision-making.</li> <li>• Integrating monitoring, evaluation and learning: They combine monitoring, evaluation, and learning to provide real-time information on progress to support evidence based decision-making</li> </ul>	<p>Donovan and Manual (2017)</p> <p>Brinkerhoff, Frazer and McGregor-Mirghani (2018)</p>
Champions of accountability	Nascent Somali accountability actors (CSO, government, academia, etc.) and associated actors willing and capable to maintain IAAAP momentum beyond the duration of IAAAP	DFID Business Case, Somalia Accountability Programme (2015)

Term	Definition	Reference
Civil Society Organisation	All civil organisations, associations and networks which occupy the 'social space' between the family and the State who come together to advocate their common interests through collective action. It includes volunteer and charity groups, parents and teachers associations, senior citizens groups, sports clubs, arts and culture groups, faith-based groups, workers clubs and trade unions, non-profit think-tanks and 'issue-based' activist groups.	DFID (2013)
Do No Harm	Do No Harm helps us get a handle on the complexity of the conflict environments where we work. It helps us see how decisions we make affect intergroup relationships. It helps us think of different ways of doing things to have better effects. The aim is to help assistance workers deal with the real complexities of providing assistance in conflicts with less frustration and more clarity and, it is hoped, with better outcomes for the societies where assistance is provided.	CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2010)
Duty Bearers	Any institution or elected or appointed official at a country or local level with relevant obligations towards adopting and ensuring appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures towards the full realisation of human rights, and most notably in relation to safety, and ensuring a violence-free city environment for women, girls and all other inhabitants, within the realm of their authority.	UN Women (nd)
Gender Analysis	Gender analysis is a systematic way of looking at the different impacts of development, policies, programs and legislation on women and men that entails, first and foremost, collecting sex-disaggregated data and gender-sensitive information about the population concerned. Gender analysis can also include the examination of the multiple ways in which women and men, as social actors, engage in strategies to transform existing roles, relationships, and processes in their own interest and in the interest of others.	<a href="http://www.un-instraw.org">http://www.un-instraw.org</a>
Gender Mainstreaming	Gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres, such that inequality between men and women is not perpetuated.	<a href="http://www.un-instraw.org">http://www.un-instraw.org</a>
Non-state actors	A non-state actor as an actor with sufficient power to influence politics, either at local or national levels, despite not belonging to any established state institution. As such, 'non-state actors' may refer to national and international NGOs, business or religious leaders, traditional authorities, workers' organisations, media, local community-based groups and networks, or diaspora.	McCullough and Saed (2017)

Term	Definition	Reference
Rights Holders	Women and girls and men and boys in the cities where a programme is being implemented, and who are entitled to rights derived from various local, national and international policies and agreements, and appropriate legislative, administrative, or other measures adopted by a state or relevant local authority towards the full realisation of human rights.	UN Women (nd)
Spoiler	Individuals or entities who believe that emerging peace or state building processes threaten their power, world view, and interests and who therefore use violence or comparable means to undermine attempts to alter the status quo to the broader public benefit.	Stedman (1997); Newman and Richmond, (2006); Menkhaus (2007); Boucher and. Holt (2009); Zahar (2010); Shaw and Kemp (2012); Nadin and Cammaert (2015)
Spoiler Economy	A dominant condition in which the cumulative interests of networks of individuals and entities is vested in a status quo of instability, because that instability offers such actors unparalleled financial opportunities and insecurity offers them means to power, all at the cost of the public interest. Consequently, such economies paralyze the prospects of peace and state building efforts seeking to stabilize conditions and establish a sense of public goods.	Gundel (2002); Hansen (2007); Collier (2009); Hagmann (2016)
Sustainability	Sustainability concerns the measurement of whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. This includes environmental as well as financial sustainability.	OECD (2016)
Xeer	The Somali customary legal system. Xeer is comprised of unwritten agreements or contracts, entered into bilaterally between clans, sub-clans and diya-paying groups that denote specifically agreed upon rights, obligations and duties (xeer dhiig). Xeer can regulate issues ranging from inter-clan relations, to levels of compensation for different illegal acts, to the management of disputes.	Simojoki (2011)

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# Annex

## IAAAP Suggested Ethical Principles and Guidance



Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme (IAAAP) is a four-year UK Aid-funded programme aiming to generate and promote a robust evidence base that will inform, influence and support a broad range of Somali and international actors to hold government more accountable.

For further information, please see [www.somaliaccountability.org](http://www.somaliaccountability.org)

